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A MULTIPLE NARRATIVE APPROACH TO INFORMATION
SYSTEMS FAILURE: A SUCCESSFUL SYSTEM THAT FAILED
Estzer BARTIS, Corvinus University of Budapest, Hungary
Nathalie MITEV, London School of Economics, United Kingdom

ABSTRACT
We discuss the introduction of an information system where the dominant coalition claimed project
success. While the key users did not use the system as intended and the project goals were not
achieved, the project committee reported success to the top management board. Using a multimethodological approach, we can follow how different stakeholders attributed different meanings to
the system introduced over time. The rhetorical tools used are analysed using a narrative
methodology. We draw on the social construction of technology and use the concept of relevant social
groups to understand the different interests influencing the organizational dynamics. We complement
this approach by employing the concepts of organisational power and cultural fit between the new
system and the different subcultures. We found that this multiple approach explains well how the
acceptance of the new software processes was interpreted differently within the organisation, and also
by the software supplier. Although limited, our case study reveals the process of socially constructing
the success or failure of an information system using this multiple research approach. We compare
our results with the literature on IS failures and we consider the value of combining constructionist
and critical approaches through a narrative methodology.

1. INTRODUCTION
IS failures have been surrounded by unabating interest in the last four decades. One main reason is that
IT investments are expensive and of high risk (Carr 2003, Lyytinen & Robey 1999, Fortune & Peters
2005). Fitzgerald and Russo (2005) refer to the Standish Group’s survey reporting that only 16% of IS
projects are completed on time and within budget. Sauer (1997) argues that to be more successful in
the future, we have to understand and learn from failures, and Mitev (2000) that failures can reveal
processes that would be hidden when systems are claimed to be successful. Some of the causes for
failure have been identified as the difficulty to manage so many different factors (Sauer & Southon
1997) or that organisations fail to learn (Lyytinen & Robey 1999). Researching IS failures originates
back in the 1960s. The early works were concerned with technological or engineering problems where
systems were not delivering the required performance (Sauer 1997). These failures originated in
hardware or software deficiencies. In the seventies, the focus turned towards user resistance and the
lack of user involvement was quickly claimed to be a major reason for failure (Argyris 1971, Ein-Dor
& Segev 1978). Later, discussions also included managerial or organisational issues but were still
resting on positivist assumptions. DeLone and McLean (1992) provide a thorough overview of the
main research in the quest for the key success factors of that time. Some 10 years later DeLone and
McLean (2003) discussed the critiques and suggestions and revised their model. Their work
concentrates on positivist research applying quantitative methods. That means a stream of growing
importance is left out of their work: interpretivist, constructionist and critical research, which use
mainly qualitative methodologies. Epistemological approaches have therefore evolved and the focus of
inquiries has broadened, taking into account wider organisational aspects. Mitev (2003) and Wilson
and Howcroft (2002) summarise these more recent approaches and emphasise the lack of consensus,
the multifaceted nature of IS and the subjectivity of the terms ‘success’ and ‘failure’. White and Leifer
(1986, p. 215) point out that “perceptions of a system’s success or failure may vary depending upon an
individual’s perspective of the system” and Mitev (2000, p. 84) raises the justifiable question: “are
there inherent differences between successful and unsuccessful [cases]?” Wilson and Howcroft (2005)
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adopt a social shaping approach showing that the empowered actors are able to turn the project into
success: they stabilise the IS by overcoming resistance and enrolling the ‘relevant social groups’. In
many cases this is an ambiguous process. There are often some aspects of the system which clearly fail
to fulfil expectations, but some actors still claim it a success – or on the contrary, a functionally
working system could be abandoned because of user resistance (Pan 2005, Dhillon 2004). In such
cases, the rationale often lies in the political processes of the organisation (Fincham 2002).

2. MULTIPLE THEORETICAL CONCEPTS
We first summarise the constructionist school to give a background to our general theoretical
perspective. The social construction of technology (SCOT) provides the notion of the Relevant Social
Group (RSG) which we used initially to analyse the case study. This was not sufficient to understand
all the events and the full dynamics, so we combined it with a critical narrative methodology, which
allowed us to go deeper in analysing the specific case material, and with which we were able to
surface the notions of organisational power and cultural fit.
Constructionism has contributed to interpretive research on the multifaceted phenomenon of IS
failures. Opposing technological determinism which suggests that technology has its own logic
determining usage and development, social shaping (MacKenzie & Wajcman 1999) and social
construction of technology have become more prevalent in the IS field. Many different approaches and
frameworks have emerged (Monteiro 2000) and they yield different insights on the interplay between
IT and organisations. Bijker and Law (2000) identify several productive traditions, which correspond
to different scientific backgrounds as well as theoretical approaches. Systems thinking (Hughes 1987)
suggest that the relationship between technology and society is dynamically changing during the
stages of technology. In the early stages of the development, a technological system will be shaped by
society. When the technological system grows and develops, it will have more influence on society
and it will begin to shape society (Dwyer 2001). By way of comparison, actor-network theory (ANT)
is a more extreme constructivist approach and aims to develop a neutral vocabulary (Akrich & Latour
2000) to describe the interactions of networked technical, social and economic elements. A
heterogeneous actor-network contains people, objects and organizations which get aligned in a
negotiation process. ANT has been criticized because of the move to grant artefacts the same
explanatory status as human actors. On the other hand, the approach which we are adopting here,
SCOT, is not so relativist but constructionist, and emphasizes the interpretative flexibility which is
attributed to technological artefacts by different relevant social groups. It can also be combined with a
critical approach more readily than ANT. Still, both SCOT and ANT transferred the focus of the
sociology of scientific knowledge (Monteiro 2000, p. 74) to the opening of the black box of
technological artefacts. Although these approaches differ both theoretically and methodologically, it is
important to note that they complement each other (Bijker & Law 2000).
One reason to use a social constructionist perspective is that “it emphasises a view of technological
development as a social process thereby enabling and understanding how social factors shape
technologies as well as providing a framework for understanding the context in which technologies are
displaced” (Wilson & Howcroft 2005, p. 18). Pinch and Bijker (1987) emphasise that ‘relevant social
groups’ attribute meanings and problems to technical artefacts. This process results in interpretative
flexibility: different social groups perceiving different problems will render different solutions to the
‘same’ technological artefact. Identifying homogeneous relevant social groups enables the discovery
of a collection of different meanings and interpretations of the situation and of the technology. Also,
conflicting viewpoints about how to resolve problems and use technology will be unfolded. Therefore,
SCOT suggests that what is a success for someone can be a failure for someone else. As Wilson and
Howcroft (2002, p. 239) argue, using the terms ‘failure’ and ‘success’ does not indicate “for whom the
technology presents itself as such”. Stabilisation of the artefact eliminates the different interpretations
of problems (Pinch & Bijker 1987, p. 44): “the key point is whether the relevant social groups see the
problem as being solved”.
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An important critique of SCOT is that it focuses primarily on design rather than use, and it is assumed
that after stabilisation, the interpretatively flexible period ceases and technology use becomes
deterministic (Orlikowski 2000). A narrative approach enabled us to follow how rhetoric moves
played a crucial role in the construction of different interpretations of use. Other IS researchers have
stated that narratives are shared by individuals, acquiring common recognition as organisational
‘stories’ (Brown & Jones 1998); According to Doolin (2003, p. 752) “any apparent stability is the
result of more or less successful ordering attempts by various actors” and “organisation is performed
in the language and practices” used by actors. He differentiates between the interpretive stream of
narrative analysis, which sees language as a symbolic medium through which social reality is
constructed; and the critical form of organisational narrative analysis which also includes with power
(Doolin 2003, p. 755). Through our narrative analysis, which we will illustrate below, we found that
rhetoric moves can be means of power and manipulation. This also corresponds to a deficiency with
the notion of RSG in which the significance of the differences in power relationships does not get
enough emphasis.
The dominant, non-critical, view in management studies is that only ‘rational’ behaviour can be
legitimised in organisations and that must be consistent with rational purposes, thus excluding power
and politics. Many scholars have identified, however, non-rational purposes as well: “[where] purpose
is to appear as though they were intended to rationalize work or to improve decision making without
having any real impact on organisational procedures or outcomes” (Markus 1983, p. 432). The
political approach to organisations recognises the interplay of interests and conflicts of different
coalitions in organisations. Power is a valuable resource in organisations (Markus, 1983) and is
unequally distributed. However, organisational politics cannot be seen to drive behaviour explicitly as
decisions cannot be legitimised with political motives based on group or individual interests. That
results in a general dynamics in organisations where “actors observe prevailing norms of rationality by
justifying action on rational grounds and honouring the appropriate organisational rules” (Wilson &
Howcroft 2005, p. 20). The sources of power are traditionally explained through the dependency of
resources view (Pfeffer 1981). Power in organisations is an attribute of individuals or different groups
of individuals (Markus 1983). According to Pfeffer (1992) the sources of power can be control over
resources; control over or extensive access to information; and formal authority. These sources of
power will be related to our critical narrative analysis.
IS embody a certain distribution of power, as information and control yield power, and any change in
IS can result in changes in power relations. Changes in power relations trigger resistance among those
who are loosing power. Organisational politics and power are considered to be of high impact on
failure or success. Dhillon (2004, p. 635) argues that “inability to understand power relationships
during systems analysis, design and implementation has serious implications (…) thus, it is a key
factor in IS projects failure.” Pan (2005, p. 176) also states that “the main purpose is to identify
stakeholders’ roles, the conflicts that might exist among these roles, and the formation of any negative
networks that could hinder project development.” Drawing from Markus (1983, p. 443) it will be
suggested that the political variant is the most appropriate framework when: organisational
participants disagree about the nature of the problem that a system is proposed to solve; there exists
uncertainty about whether the particular proposed system will solve the problem; and the power bases
allocated are highly valued and in short supply. Conversely, the SCOT perspective combines well with
the power approach: focussing on stakeholders or coalitions (or ‘relevant social groups’) in an
organisation is compliant with the organisational politics perspective. It is important to take into
account the stakeholders’ interests as implementing an information system “requires the effective
participation of diverse stakeholders” (Pan 2005, p. 174). Different interpretations from the different
stakeholders are formulated and spread in the organisation in the form of narratives.
Narratives are defined as a "tale, story, and recital of facts, especially story told in the first person"
(Myers 1997). A narrative research methodology focuses on understanding how human beings deal
with experience by constructing stories and listening to the stories of others (Riessman 1993).
Researching narratives reveals the important insight that human activity and experience are filled with
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"meaning" and that stories rather than logical arguments or lawful formulations, are the vehicle by
which that meaning is communicated (Sarbin 1995). The narrative perspective is a promising tool to
observe the dynamics of rhetoric in organisations: the changing of the ‘official’ story over time.
Narratives are frames for sense making focussing on symbolic and rhetorical aspects (Fincham 2002).
Narratives also serve as social labelling, attributing sense-making categories to actions, events or
artefacts. Behaviour and actions are influenced by sense making (Orlikowski & Gash 1994), and sense
making can be affected by narratives. Therefore, “the evolution of narrative sequences emphasizes the
ways in which action is changed and influenced” (Fincham 2002, p. 2). We argue that narratives are
tools for persuading organisational members (different RSG) and eliminating divergent interpretations,
thus influencing stakeholders and building political coalitions, which fits in with the political
perspective outlined above. Another important aspect influencing the behaviour of organisational
members is the organisational culture, which is the last concept we are combining to our
constructionist theoretical framework.
The concept of organisational culture and the fit of the newly introduced IS with the organisation’s
culture shed light on important aspects of the social dynamics surrounding an IS. Schein (1996, p.
236) defines organisational culture as “the set of shared, taken-for-granted implicit assumptions that a
group holds and that determines how it perceives, thinks about, and reacts to its various environment.”
Organisational culture also manifests itself in visible ways (physical artefacts and behaviour);
however, as it is based on deeper, hardly ever explicit assumptions, it is hard to change. All the
assumptions “held by members of the organisation interrelate to form the culture that shapes decisionmaking processes and influences specific choices and behaviours” (Pliskin & Romm 1993, p. 144).
Many researchers (Claver & Llopis 2001, Avison & Myers 1995, Wainwright & Waring 2004) claim
that the consideration of organisational culture is somewhat neglected in IS research and practice. It is
therefore important to include because in many failed system introductions, the organisational cultural
fit is not considered (Gallivan 1997). Pliskin et al. (1993) suggest that important characteristics of the
unique culture of the organisation should be considered prior to implementing new technologies.
Based on empirical cases they conclude that there is a need for alignment between the taken-forgranted assumptions about work and organisation and the cultural assumptions embedded in the
system by its designers. Ensuring the alignment of the IS and the organisational culture is even more
difficult if it is designed and developed by a third party. The software vendor’s designers build in their
assumptions into the software features and routines.
SCOT is the main constructionist theoretical perspective used here, and through a critical form of
narrative methodology we enrich it using the notions of power and organisational culture. Mitev
(2005) has explored whether constructionist approaches are critical, and how they can be applied to
studying IS success and failure. Constructionist approaches are critical in that they undermine the
inevitabilism of accounts of technological success or failure; their contingency perspective questions
the belief that socio-technical development can be controlled and managed. On the other hand,
complementing a constructionist approach with a critical narrative methodology enables us to explore
how actors are representatives of organisational agendas and how commercially-driven technical
innovation can have political implications.
We show next how the different concepts used interact and form a solid and interlinked perspective.
Constructionism is useful to follow firstly how initial ideas and opinions about the technology congeal
(stabilisation); and secondly how powerful relevant social groups have a decisive influence when
forming this quickly congealing public or group opinion. This is the point where the additional
methodology of narratives proves useful. The different interpretations and ‘stories’ reveal that there
are different interests and perspectives of relevant social groups. Exposing these alternative accounts
sheds light on the process of the social construction of failure or success. Combining it with RSG, “it
becomes possible to identify who contrives things such that their perspective is recounted as ‘the’
story” (Wilson & Howcroft 2002, p. 239). In our analysis, we focus on the “purposive aspect”
(Fincham 2002, p. 1) of the narratives which serve the interests of the RSGs. The narratives
perspective highlights the dynamics of the ‘official’ explanation which creates, influences and
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manipulates public opinion. We will present different narratives from different relevant social groups
at different times and analyse the discrepancies. The narratives also allow us to highlight the cultural
differences between the culture embedded in the system and the organisational work culture. First, the
dominant discourse in the organisation focuses on the taken-for-granted assumptions about work itself.
The taken-for-granted assumptions are difficult to research as they manifest themselves in behaviour,
rituals and values (Avison & Myers 1995). Through some observation, we tried to draw conclusions
regarding the characteristics of the culture. Secondly, we examine the organisational culture reasons
for failure identified by Gallivan (1997): how different sub cultures were ignored leading to a lack of
cultural fit.
We base our theoretical stance on constructionism, which we combine with a critical narrative
methodology to examine how the meaning and the evaluation of the introduced system are socially
constructed: (1) narratives influence the sense making process and people’s understandings, and
therefore, drive the construction of the common understanding; (2) organisational power as relevant
social groups are constructing meaning, and the power relations between them; (3) organisational
culture as the underlying assumptions shaping understandings and behaviour. These three facets were
found to mutually influence each other and define the social construction of the evaluation and the
usage of the introduced system.

3. RESEARCH METHODS
Primary data was collected on two different occasions and predominantly through qualitative methods.
The first data collection was conducted inside the company during January and February 2006. The
second collection was in June 2006 when the software vendor firm was visited and key users were
interviewed again for validation and to review system acceptance. The case study is cross-sectional
rather than longitudinal because some key project stakeholders moved into different positions, or left
the company. Access to data was ensured through good personal relationships with the project
manager, Anna (not her real name). She also provided rich data about the company culture and helped
to get into informal discussions with employees involved in the project. Primary sources were semistructured interviews with the key actors including the project sponsor, the project owner, and
managers and clerks from all departments involved. On the second occasion, we interviewed the
supplier firms’ managing director and the account manager. 22 semi-structured interviews and two
focus group discussions were conducted in the two organisations (the software implementer and the
vendor). Interviews lasted between 30 minutes and 2 hours. Participant observation also took place
and documentary data was collected: handbooks, user instructions, and internal web pages. We had the
opportunity to access the system, which provided a deeper understanding of the software’s features
and functions. Further important data was provided by informal conversations during factory and field
visits. To complement qualitative methods, statistical data on the number of registered users and
system usage were gathered. The company operates in Europe and names used are pseudonyms for
confidentiality reasons.

4. CASE STUDY
In January 2004 Beta Company, a subsidiary of a large multinational FMCG company, decided to
introduce a new work time registration (WTR) system. The country’s regulations demanded that work
time data are recorded daily and stored for 5 consecutive years. In any disputable case regarding
working hours, these documents would constitute conclusive evidence. The project started in February
2004 and ran for eight months with no significant results delivered. Following the lay off of the former
project manager, a new project manager was appointed early November 2004, and in 4 months the
whole system was introduced step-by-step in all 14 locations countrywide. While the system could
neither fulfil all the required functionalities, nor was the former paper-based administration eliminated
(unlike the project’s original goals), the project was still claimed as successful by the board of
directors. Gamma was chosen as supplier, as it already operated the outsourced payroll system of Beta
Company. In this service industry, Gamma was the largest in the country and with a good reputation.
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Full support in database maintenance and several Beta-specific developments were promised, but not
included in the contract. A full outsourcing was decided with the servers and the data storage
remaining outside Beta’s firewall. The WTR system was to be accessed via a secure Internet
connection. After the contract was signed, access to the system was ensured. In Beta three different
pilot groups were set up to test processes and specific issues with usage. However, the feedback from
the pilots was not systematically tracked by Beta, neither were the needed developments delivered by
Gamma. As the WTR system was still not launched by November 2004, a new project manager was
appointed and the former left the company.
In Beta, all employees’ working hours and attendance are registered in the same work time registration
system. However, the population of employees is far from homogeneous. Three main subgroups were
identified during pilot testing. The main differences are: flexibility of working hours; planning and
flexibility of holidays; wages/salary; hierarchical level; organisational culture (subcultures) and
geographical location. The main groups are the manufacturing workers, the sales force and the
management. The boundaries between groups are influenced by the location. For instance, managers
working with the sales force or managers working in the factory tend to assimilate with the local
subculture, although with differing interests. A main difference between different user groups can be
epitomized by stating that wages workers had a basic interest in filling-in the data, while managers
hadn’t. For employees receiving wages and having little flexibility in working hours and holidays, the
work-time registration and therefore, the system, played a pivotal role. It had a direct impact on the
amount of money received monthly and, living close to subsistence wages, their livelihood was at
stake. On the other hand, managers receiving a fixed salary and getting holidays fairly easily had no
particular dependence on the data recorded in the system. As no significant punishments were
compliant with the company culture, not filling-in the data had no consequences in the case of
managers. Also, data accuracy demanded that wages workers record data daily or, in the worst case,
weekly, while for managers, monthly recording was sufficient.
The ‘official’ narrative about the project changed over time and relates to different user groups’
perceptions. Changes in the official narrative are illustrated below (together with the interviewee and
date). When appointing the new project manager, she was told that the “only problem was about
communication” (Project Sponsor, early November 2004) and that “everything is ready, pilot tests
have been successful, all you need is to communicate the kick off date” (Former Project Manager,
handover November 2004). After handover the HR Director (Project Sponsor) identified other issues:
the affected databases were not linked and the steering committee knew only vaguely what was going
on. Therefore, the official narrative changed to “you need to sort out a few technical problems”
(Project Sponsor, mid-November, 2004). Gaining access to the system and receiving official training
made clear to the project manager that user data had not been entered. The few users with access had
forgotten their passwords and the last time they logged in had been June 2004. The project manager
also realised that the user interface was not user-friendly and had a completely different inherent logic
than other administrative systems in the company. Visiting the factory site, she identified user
resistance problems, but the dominant problem was that no one could reliably handle the system. New
training was organised and user instructions prepared and distributed. User resistance was almost
eliminated when clerks and shift managers saw the project manager’s efforts.
Following the next steering committee meeting, the official narrative changed completely: “this
project is a terrible mess, we are so lucky to have Anna here to sort out all the issues” (Project
sponsor, late November 2004). They were satisfied with her work and somewhat less concerned about
the problems. However, the project manager realised that the pilot with the other critical group, the
field force, had ceased because the manager trained had been promoted. Therefore, the new system
had not been tested in that group with very special requirements. Still, at the next meeting, the Project
Sponsor stated that it was impossible to delay the introduction any longer: “what do you think is the
earliest we can start? Could you make it January?”(Project Sponsor, early December 2004). A
compromise was reached on an incremental rollout: “we really needed quick wins to present it for the
organisation and the people involved. That could also serve as a good example and help the next
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group to roll-in more smoothly” (Project Manager, early December 2004). The sequence of the rollout
was decided based on the “reputation” of the units, i.e. how cooperative they were, so the rollout
started at the factory’s site.
Training and presentations were organised for different user groups. The data of the 250 factory
employees were entered into the system and on 2nd January the system was launched. Everything went
right and people filled out their attendance sheets. The project manager sent a group email for the
members of the steering committee reporting that everything went fine. Until the next day: as she
turned on her mobile phone, messages and calls started: all data was lost from the system. Due to a
problem in the server at the contractor, all work-time data had been lost. It caused delay in data
processing and, of course, very low morale. The reasons were not acknowledged by Gamma, who
blamed everything on the clerks at Beta. The project manager talking about the business relationship
with Gamma stated that: “I believe they do not take us seriously. They thought we would never
introduce the new system. I am surprised though as that is their business interest”. The project
manager added: “we not only had technical and trust problems with the outsourcing partner but low
morale among employees. Still, the project had to go to save HR’s face.”
In February, the next stage in the rollout was management staff in head office. As they had flexible
work-time, they needed just one click to indicate that they were not absent, however, the majority just
forgot about it. Filling-in the timesheet was not their priority as they received a salary and were not
paid for overtime. On the last days of the months, clerks usually went crazy seeing that no one had
filled in their sheets. In March and April, the system was rolled out for the sales force working in
remote depots. The technical problems experienced there were wide ranging: access to the site, loosing
data, and the holiday-planner being unavailable. The servers were overloaded, as Gamma, after
experiencing the delays with the launch, hadn’t installed a more expensive server with sufficient
capacity. Similarly, they never developed the promised holiday-planner; it remained a mock interface
in the system.
Two important non-managerial user groups were the HR staff and the Supervisors, the latter
responsible for planning shifts in the Manufacturing Division and in the Sales Department, and their
daily work was significantly changed by the WTR system. They were involved in the pilot phase and
gained initial training and access to the system. Also, the Sales Department had very special needs for
planning and managing the routes and the work time of sales representatives. HR staff reacted to the
system differently as some were leaving, some had to take over the work of the persons who left, and
some took the task seriously and became experts: “we sat down with Anna for one whole day and went
through all the functions. I took notes. As an unknown problem occurred, I called her immediately and
we resolved it together. In my area, everybody fills in. I check the table the day before the deadline
and send email warnings. It works.” (HR administrator, January 2005). The others were not so
successful and could not handle the system until as late as March: “I am working for two people; I do
not have time to learn this new system. As far as I see it is quite stupid” (HR administrator, early
March 2005).
The shift planners in Manufacturing did not take the system seriously as for a long time nothing
happened to the system: “I have been filling in the system for a few months but nobody ever asked me
or told me anything about it. I have not been doing it for a while now. We still use these big black
books to register work time. Yes, manually. Every morning we check who showed up” (Shift Planner,
early November 2004). When they had to start using the system: “planning people ask for machine
usage. This system cannot store that kind of data, so now I have to fill in both manually and into the
system. We have asked Anna to change the system and she promised that she talks to Gamma people. I
hope it gets resolved soon, as I have to work double now…” (Shift Planner, mid December 2004).
However, as Gamma was not making the requested developments (claiming that they were not paid),
users got more and more worried and upset. During December and January, lost data was also
reported. The clerks were complaining: “I have to work much more since this new system is here. I am
entering the data, which is not easy at all, and suddenly the screen turns blue and all the data I
entered is lost. It is VERY annoying. I discussed it with [my boss] and he said if these problems do not
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get resolved, we will return to the old system.” (Administrative Clerk, early February 2005). Gamma
never acknowledged any problems and the Project Manager could not prove anything, being refused
access to the log which was recorded by Gamma’s system managers. The complaints from the
Manufacturing site were never made official and the problems of the shift planners and clerks were
overlooked.
The Sales Department was unintentionally left out from the pilot phase, which proved to be very
problematic later. At the beginning, they took the system very seriously, and approached the Project
Manager with their suggestions and ideas to improve the system. However, Gamma could not keep up
the pace with the backlog, even after invoicing and payment issues were settled. “We told her [the
project manager] what we need. The system is clearly unable to support our holiday planning and the
substitutions which are both core activities. I am not using the system anymore. I’ve returned to Excel
and every week I ask one of the guys to enter the data for the whole group” (Sales Supervisor, early
April 2005). The Project Manager added in April 2005: “we had many discussions with Gamma
people at all managerial levels. They promised the developments and mostly kept the deadlines. But
we were simply not on the same page. They were unable and I think, also unwilling to understand that
our organisation works differently from theirs. Solutions based on their processes and understandings
will always be problematic and unproductive for us…”
The narratives of the non-managerial groups are different from one group to another. HR staff
diverged in their approach, some had faith, putting effort into learning the new system, others just
struggled through the reporting period. The manufacturing and sales groups were initially open
towards the system and were willing to use it. After the first difficulties they still remained cooperative and either suggested solutions (Sales Department), or were willing to learn and understand
the system (Manufacturing Department). However, after they saw that the situation did not improve,
they chose alternative methods to keep track of the work time of their staff. The Sales Department
returned to the cross-linked, fully functional Excel Sheets, while the Manufacturing Department kept
using paper sheets to record the shifts. Gamma logged systems usage data which can be used as an
accessible, objective and fairly simple indicator of user acceptance and system success (DeLone &
McLean 1992, p. 68). We carried out a quantitative log analysis, not reported in detail here, which
shows that manufacturing workers and the sales force used the WTR system to fill in their work-time
data, but that managers did not, and that their filling out rate dropped as time passed. As a result, HR
clerks had to make huge efforts to collect all the data at the end of each month. It is suggested that for
managers the system did not become part of their working routines for two reasons: they suffer no
consequences for non-use; and using an irrelevant system once a month makes it too hard to remember
how to use.
Hard work and tough high-level negotiations with Gamma led to several developments which resulted
in the system’s basic functions working. Shortly after, the project phase ceased as the Project Manager
was needed in another project. Some functionality problems still remain; but HR administrators gained
enough expertise to solve the frequently recurring problems. Officially, the project phase ended in
June 2005. This meant that no manager was appointed to deal with problems and developments.
According to the Project Manager, towards the end the steering committee “neither wanted to hear
about WTR problems anymore, nor wanted to commit additional managerial time for solving
problems”. To summarise, the HR Director was keen for the system to be implemented, managers
were non-users of the system for the reasons explained above, and never experienced the
implementation problems experienced by wages workers who depended on the system for their
livelihood. Manufacturing and sales staff initially had a positive attitude which then turned into
disappointment and anger, and finally into resignation.

5. ANALYSIS
The RSGs have been described in the section above and their perceptions of the technology are first
summarised below. Using a narrative methodology we then concentrate our analysis on the change of
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narratives over time. This enables us to bring out organisational power and politics, which we then
extend into a discussion of the cultural fit between the system and the organisation.
There were important differences in the various RSGs’ perceptions of the role of the WTR system.
The HR Director wanted this ‘messy, shameful’ project to be finished quickly and all employees to
enrol. Enrolment was not problematic for wages workers: the system had a direct impact on obtaining
their monthly allowance, so recording their working hours was one crucial organising principle of
their daily work. But for managers, their salary was fixed. So they did not attach importance to the
administrative demand of filling-out their monthly presence sheets. Therefore, technical problems
were of central importance for employees in lower hierarchical levels while most managers never
logged-in and still received a salary. It is clear that different RSGs attributed different values to the
technological artefact. The official narrative about the new system was mainly driven by the HR
director and changed over time as shown below.

This can be compared to alternative narratives detailed in the previous section, showing how other key
users perceived events. Comparing narratives allows us to distinguish power relations to explain
whose interest and version became dominant. Implementing new software did not directly threaten
positions or the status quo. The new system changed manual paper-based procedures to similar
computer-based processes. As there was no change in locus or structure of information, no shift in
power relations occurred. What was threatened, however, was the reputation of the HR Function and
the HR Director. Organisational politics presented itself in a different way: face saving or the
reputation of the HR Department was at risk. The project contract and the pilot were announced to the
Board of Directors right at its launch, in January 2004, which was told that ‘everything is fine’ and was
promised that ‘very soon people will receive the WTR training’. As no progress was made for a long
time after that, the HR Director’s and the HR Department’s reputations became threatened. This threat
could only be warded off by implementing the system quickly. The success criterion was the system
introduction and the proportion of enrolled users, almost regardless of the system quality or
functionality. The dynamics can be explained further by examining how the sources of power were
used by the HR Director. She used her power over resources when she laid off the former project
manager and appointed a new one expecting improvements. Important was her control over access to
information. She used it in two ways: (1) in the top management team nobody really knew about the
problems with the system as no problems were let to get to that high level. Instead, she gave the Board
the impression that everything was going well; (2) when problems started to arise, the HR Director
used her power of agenda by influencing what questions were discussed at meetings. The evaluation
of the WTR system was never on the agenda at higher level meetings. The fact that her agenda got
prioritised and that her version became the official narrative were due to her formal authority. This
analysis shows that identifying RSGs does not necessarily reveal power relations and neglects the
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inequalities in the possibilities of legitimising the interests of the different groups, which is achieved
through the construction of narratives by actors. In our case, the identified RSGs were at different
hierarchical levels. The power of clerks and factory workers cannot be compared to that of the HR
Director.
In retrospect, it is clear that the initial narrative mainly served the purpose of ‘selling’ the project to
the new project manager. On the other hand, as she recalls: “soon it became obvious that they hardly
knew anything about the project. To be honest, I am sure they had no clue, what is done and what is
not, or what could be the main concerns.” To illustrate her feelings about the project: “now I could
describe it, they sold me a project like a little ladybird which later turned into a huge hundred-armed
monster. Not that I am complaining: this way I got a much better opportunity to prove my skills.”
Using the narrative methodology shows that the early mess and lack of results were manipulated, with
little relation to any achievements by the new project manager. Building on the previous delays and
struggling, it could be announced that the system was indeed introduced and used. This observation
supports an important aspect of narratives, namely, that success and failure are not distinct notions but
entwined in meaning and action (Fincham 2002).
The final stage of our analysis is to point out that two organisational subcultures at Beta had a strong
influence on events, decisions and narratives. The wages workers regard work time registration as
crucial to their living, but the managerial layer’s salaries are fixed, so managers do not have any
incentive to entering data. Initial decision makers neglected to consider this difference; judgements on
the system desirability and success were made based on managers’ perceptions; and the interest of the
administrative clerks was never considered. The attitude of the software vendor Gamma mattered too.
Its employees are dominantly software engineers and programmers. Management also has technical or
engineering expertise. Gamma used WRT for their own work time registration. They often expressed
opinions like: “I do not understand why it is difficult to record the work time data every day. One has
simply to log on, fill in the daily data and save the changes. For me it takes a minute if not less”
(Gamma Account Manager, late March 2005). They seem not to try to understand Beta’s culture and
saw its employees as problematic and unreliable. Conversely, the Beta project team thought Gamma
were unwilling to help, rigid and uncooperative. Additionally, while the work of the HR
administrators and administrative clerks at Beta doubled, Gamma received Beta payroll input data
ready for their system ready for processing, thus reducing their costs. These differences between
Beta’s two internal subcultures and between Beta and Gamma organisational cultures explain how
many problems evolved during system implementation, initial training, system maintenance and
additional developments. Gamma was seemingly using its own perceptions while designing the WTR
software whereas Beta’s existing processes were rooted in their organisational culture (Schein 1996).
Gallivan’s notion of culture fit (1997, p. 243) helps identify the following reasons for the IS failure:
the system was neglecting the incentives inherent in the worker’s jobs; and there was no relationship
between the users of the system and its beneficiaries; and the relationship between the designers and
the users was fraught.

6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
We used a multiple narrative methodology to understand what happened in Beta. The social
construction of technology is our theoretical premise reflecting our focus on how knowledge was
constructed about technological success and failure. One of its concepts, relevant social groups, has
already been used to investigate IS failure (Wilson & Howcroft 2005). It was a good starting point to
see how different RSGs attributed different meanings to the WTR system and, consequently, how
different interests and problems arose. The narrative methodology exposed how different groups
shaped the sense making. Used critically, it enabled us to surface the notion of organisational power in
seeing why the narrative, meaning and interests of the more powerful RSGs prevailed. And the lack of
fit between the new system and the organisational sub-cultures indicated why users were dissatisfied
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and the system under-utilised. It could not be resisted nor bypassed by certain groups for which use
was unavoidable to get paid (paradoxically for those for whom it was most complex to use properly).
Although our present account may not provide a full narrative of the case, by exploring and comparing
multiple narratives critically we found that there was a dominant narrative which turned the project
into a success and thus inhibited any learning from the failures. In this case, there were numerous
mistakes, defective analyses and rash decisions. Some of the potential learning points would have
been: a new IT enabled business process needs to be specified and supported organisationally; the
organisational cultures need to be taken into account; and piloting can yield important information
which should not be ignored. Some of these have been expressed by the project manager and cooperating managers; but as these problems are not explicitly acknowledged, only directly affected
employees have to deal with this difficult new system. And the lessons learned did not become
organisational knowledge. As Weick (2001) points out, people only learn what they want: their
observations are filtered through taken-for granted assumptions. No management-related learning
points were made explicitly but the low-level administrative employees adapted their processes and
behaviours to the new, ill-fitting system.
More broadly, the notion of RSGs showed that attributing success or failure was constructed
differently by various groups. The narratives of the HR Director influenced the judgement of the top
management who believed it was a success. But frequent users know that the system is dysfunctional
and problematic. Their everyday experiences could not be changed by the official narrative.
Understanding why a dysfunctional system not reaching its objectives was claimed as successful, the
perspective of organisational power is unavoidable. The narratives perspective shed light on the
system serving the power games, but in itself would be insufficient. If we focus on why the system
was not accepted by the users, organisational cultural provides an additional explanation, and neither
RSGs nor organisational power is sufficient. This shows the limitations of each methodological lens
and how a multiple approach is beneficial, in this case combining constructionism and a critical
narrative perspective, both of which treating reality as simultaneously social, technical and discursive
(Doolin 2003, p. 766).
Finally, our study has the usual limitations: its generalisability and replicability, as well as the question
of making sense of the sequences of events only ex post, when one would hope to prevent future
failures. But every case is unique, and we are only able to use theories to the extent “to which data
from real-world cases can be found to be consistent with the assumptions of the theories” (Markus
1983, p. 433). On the other hand, this case study draws similar conclusions about failure as Brown and
Jones (1998, p. 85), although in reverse: in their failure case, they found that narratives tend to be
“post-hoc rationalisations”, “simplify the lessons to be learned” and “produce a coherent interpretation
attributing cause [of failure] elsewhere”; in our case, the main narrative followed comparable patterns
but about success. This confirms that similar processes are at work in organisational reports of success
and failure, which addresses our initial research question hypothesising about the lack of inherent
differences between successful and unsuccessful cases (Mitev 2000).
Several other aspects could have yielded additional valuable insights: the notion of project escalation
(Keil 1995); the difficulties with early specification of requirements and the logic and structure of the
software, which could also have been connected to the cultural fit; the dynamics of how the initial
usage and experiences congeal fast (Tyre & Orlikowski 1994); how usage is highly influenced by
champions (Orlikowski et al. 1995); the initial understanding through taken-for-granted assumptions;
and finally the inter-organisational politics to reveal the dynamics of the relationship with the supplier
and the outsourcing difficulties.
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